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Case Comment
Re Hoogendoorn and Greening Metal Products et al.
LABouR RELATIONS - COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT - ARBITRATION - RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDuAL EMPLOYEE - NATURAL JUSTICE.*
Ever since the present industrial relations legislation was imple-
mented some thirty years ago in the United States and substantially
copied in Ontario some ten years later, the question as to the extent
of individual rights under a collective bargaining agreement has been
intensely debated. An authoritative answer has recently been handed
down by the Supreme Court of Canada. Be Hoogendoorn and Green-
ing Metal Products et al,' (the Hoogendoorn Case), deals with the
rather neat due process problem presented when a union takes a
grievance to arbitration, the outcome of which may affect the inter-
ests of an individual employee which are opposed to the interests of
the union.
Dirk Hoogendoorn began working for the Greening Company in
September 1955. In June 1962, Local 6266, United Steelworkers of
America was certified as bargaining agent for the employees of the
Company, which was previously unorganized. In December 1962 a
collective agreement was entered into which provided for a dues check-
off, evidently non-compulsory. A subsequent agreement in March
1965, provided for compulsory deduction of union dues. The 1965
agreement was amended when it was discovered that the wording did
not cover existing employees. The amended agreement specified that
employees were to sign and deliver to the company, authorizations for
deduction as a condition of their continued employment.2
Hoogendoorn, a member of the Christian Labour Association of
Canada, in accordance with the principles of that organization, viewed
the Steelworkers Union unfavourably, and consequently, for "religious
and political reasons" he refused to authorize deductions of dues for
the Union. After numerous skirmishes, not here relevant, the Union
ultimately resorted to a wildcat strike to force the Company either
to fire Hoogendoorn or to have him sign an authorization. The wild-
cat strike was settled upon agreement between the Company and the
Union to take the matter to arbitration.
* Roderick G. Ferguson, B.A. (Waterloo), LL.B. (Osgoode).
1 Trial, (Grant J.)-[19661 2 O.R. 746, Appeal (Laskin, Schroeder, Wells,
J.J.A.) [19671 1 O.R. 712, Supreme Court of Canada, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641 (Hall,
Spence, Ritchie, Judson and Cartwright J.J.).
2 Article V, Sec. 5.02. The section reads as follows:
As a condition of their continued employment, all present employees shall,
on or before the 15th day of September 1965, and all future employees
shall, within 30 days following their employment be required to execute
and deliver to the Company, an authorization for deduction of their union
dues or an amount equivalent to the regular monthly dues paid by mem-
bers, as the case may be. Such authorization may be revoked by any
employee by giving written notice to the Company and the Union within
the 30 day period prior to the termination date of the contract.
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After agreeing to submit the matter to a sole arbitrator rather
than the Board of Arbitration specified in the collective agreement,
the Union submitted the following grievance agreement to the arbi-
trator, County Court Judge G. H. F. Moore:
It is the Union contention that on March 18, 1966, the Company did
violate Article V, Section 5.02 of the Current Collective Agreement as
amended on September 1st, 1965.
The arbitrator found that the Company was in violation of Sec-
tion 5.02 and required the Company
... to notify the employee Hoogendoorn in writing forthwith by regis-
tered mail, that he must execute and deliver to the Company a proper
authorization form for deduction of his union dues or an amount equiva-
lent to the regular monthly dues paid by members as the case may be(enclosing such form) within seven (7) days from the date of the post-
mark date on the envelope containing the notice or be discharged from
his employment. If Mr. Hoogendoorn fails to comply then I direct that
the Company exercise its powers as an employer and discharge him.
Hoogendoorn was not notified of this proceeding, nor was he
present at it, nor was he consulted about it.5
A motion by way of certiorari in the High Court by Hoogendoorn,
to have the arbitration award quashed, was dismissed.4 Hoogendoorn's
argument, that he was entitled to notice (and the right to intervene)
since his interest could not be properly represented by the Union, was
rejected. Grant J. based his decison on the nature of the grievance,
which he found was a "policy grievance." The trial judge reasoned
that the issue before the arbitrator was whether or not the company
was in breach of the agreement in failing to require employees to
submit authorizations; Hoogendoorn's actions were not at issue. Grant
J. thought it important in this respect that Hoogendoorn did not lose
his job by virtue of the award, and would not have standing until the
company discharged him.5
3 The facts were not in dispute. I have derived this summary of the facts
chiefly from the judgment of Hall J.
4 [1966] 2 O.R. 746.
5 Grant J. would have dismissed the motion on the alternate ground
that the grievance procedure was not resorted to by Hoogendoorn before
bringing his motion in the Courts. This is curious reasoning and it is unfor-
tunate that it is not mentioned again either in the Court of Appeal or Supreme
Court. It Is obvious that the Union would not take up Hoogendoorn's griev-
ance and it would seem unjust to dismiss his motion perhaps because he
made no formal request of the Union to do so: the law does not demand the
performance of fruitless duties. If Grant J. means that Hoogendoorn should
have taken the grievance himself (the collective agreement gave employees
the right to "present individual grievances to management"), the same rea-
soning would apply in light of the arbitration award. It is possible Grant J.
thought this right would include the right to take the grievance to arbitra-
tion. If so, he is overlooking that this is very much an open question, see
below footnote 39. Laskin J.A. states views on Appeal, opposed to allowing
individuals to take their grievances to arbitration themselves: [1967] 1 O.R.
at 722, 724 and 726. The Supreme Court did not mention the point.
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In the Court of Appeal, 6 the majority (Laskin and Schroeder
J.J.A). were in favour of dismissing Hoogendoorn's appeal. Wells J.A.
delivered a strong dissent.
Wells J.A. thought the arbitration award should be quashed
because the Union was the only agency representing Hoogendoorn,
and was at the same time seeking his dismissal. The arbitration, Wells
J.A. agreed, involved in form, the interpretation of the agreement,
but when one penetrates beyond the terms of the procedure, one sees
that the union in fact was not prepared to look after Hoogendoorn's
discharge from the company and desired his discharge unless he agreed
to the check-off of the union dues from his pay.7
And later Wells J.A. asserted,
On the facts it [the proceeding] was aimed entirely at Hoogendoorn. 8
Laskin J.A. on the other hand did not view the arbirtation in
that light; he found that the proceedings were
... to resolve any doubt of the meaning and operative effect of Art. 5.02
of the amended collective agreement and, particularly, to determine who
had the duty to administer it.9
The arbitrator's finding amounted to,
imposing a duty on the company to direct an employee to sign a
dues deduction authorization form or face disciplinary action by way of
discharge.10
Laskin J.A. also pointed out that further action would be required
before Hoogendoorn would be fired; Hoogendoorn's discharge was not
the result of the award.
Grant J. and Laskin J.A. were apparently attempting to establish
that the threat to the jobs of Hoogendoorn and others who refused
to abide by Article 5.02, was created by the collective agreement
containing that section, and not by the arbitration proceedings. To
put it shortly, Hoogendoorn had no economic security to be threatened
once the collective agreement was made.
Laskin J.A. declared that the grievance here was a "policy
grievance", and defined what he meant by that term; first it is a
method
. . to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and a possible clogging of the
grievance adjustment machinery and to avoid undue expense as well ...
Not all may benefit equally; and some may be adversely affected; but the
virtue of the policy grievance is that it is an extension of the administra-
tion of the bargain by the parties who concluded it, and the award therein
becomes, in effect, a clarifying term of the agreement.. 11
Secondly, the policy grievance is a means of redressing
6 [1967] 1 Q.R. 712.
7 [1967] 1 0.R. at 715.
8 Id., at 716.
9 Id., at 721.
10 Id.
11 Id., at 725.
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. . . an alleged violation of a promise or term in the agreement running
in favour of the Union itself from the company...12
It is the latter type of policy grievance that the union was pur-
suing in this case, Laskin J.A. pointed out.
In light of the above reasoning, the Court of Appeal severed that
part of the arbitrator's award which ordered the dismissal of Hoogen-
doom if he did not deliver an authorization, since this went beyond the
issues raised in the arbitration proceedings.
The next development relevant to the Hoogendoorn case curiously
enough, is the decision of the Court of Appeal in another case, Re
Bradley et al. and Ottawa Professional Fire Fighters Association et
al.13 Laskin J.A. again wrote the decision, a decision which enabled
him to further explain the views he adopted in his Hoogendoorn
judgment.
In the Bradley case, six junior men had been promoted and the
union felt, in perfectly good faith, that accordng to the requirements
of the collective agreement, six senior men should have received the
promotion. The matter was carried through to arbitration on behalf
of the latter, but the six junior men were not notified of the proceed-
ings, nor that their promotions were in jeopardy. Laskin J.A. held that
this case was readily distinguishable from Hoogendoorn. Here the
arbitrator went beyond the interpretation of the agreement and found
that those promoted should not have been; here was a specific finding
with reference to those whose jobs were in question; they should have
received notice.
Laskin J.A. stated:
... The common law has been specially sensitive to deprivation of prop-
erty or contractual advantages in proceedings of an adjudicative character
without previous notice thereof to persons likely to be directly affected,14
unless there is clear statutory exclusion of such notice.
The union had tried to argue, in the light of Hoogendoorn, that
since the six junior employees should not have been promoted, they
had no rights in need of protection. Laskin J.A. called this argument
"ex post facto reasoning."
But, is it not similar "ex post facto reasoning" in Hoogendoorn's
case? Why could the court find the rights of the employees in Bradley
to be in jeopardy and not find Hoogendoorn's rights to be similarly
threatened? Bradley and the others had received promotions alleged
to be in contravention of the agreement; Hoogendoorn had retained ajob in contravention of the agreement. What is the difference?
Note especially this paragraph in the Bradley decision:
Judge Short in his award stated at the outset that 'the grievance concerns
solely the proper interpretation to be placed upon Section 12.01'. He went
on to construe this provision, and it is conceded that if he had concludedhis award after giving his construction, it would not have been open toBradley and the certiorari applicants to challenge it. The arbitration
12 Id.
13 [1967] 2 O.R. 311 (the Bradley case).
14 Id., at 317.
[VOL. 6
Case Comment
would then have amounted to a declaratory proceeding by which the
Association and the city would have resolved their differences as to the
proper meaning of Art. 12.01; and how that meaning would affect promo-
tions already made on those to be made would be a matter for further
consideration and determination. If the arbitrator had proceeded in this
manner the case would be within the principle examined by this court in
Re Hoogendoor and Greening Metal Products and Screening Equipment
Co. et al. [1967] 1 O.R. 712, 62 D.L.R. (2d) 167.15
The distinction is an elusive one, if it exists at all. Looking at it
in another way, why could the court not let the interpretation part of
the award stand, and excise the offending particular findings and
directions as it did in Hoogendoorn's case? 16 It would be a poor pro-
tection if individual rights could be so easily avoided by merely
refraining from having the arbitrator apply his decision. To my mind
the only distinction is that this would be an example of Laskin J.A.'s
first type of policy grievance, whereas in Hoogendoorn it was an
example of the second. Should the individual be excluded from inter-
vening in an arbitration on the ground only that the issue concerns a
right flowing to the union itself?
The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in
Hoogendoorn's case after the Court of Appeal decided Bradley. The
majority of the Supreme Court were in favour of allowing the appeal
and quashing the arbitrator's award. Judson J. speaking for himself
and Ritchie J., would have dismissed the appeal, agreeing with Laskin
J.A. in the Court of Appeal decision in the case:
I agree with the majority judgment [in the Court of Appeal]. The scheme
of the Labour Relations Act is to provide for a bargaining agent which
is given power to conclude an agreement with an employer, on behalf of
the employees. No ratification or consent by the employees or any of
them is required before a lawful agreement can be concluded and the
bargaining agent is given specific authority by the Act to make the kind
of agreement represented by Art. 5.02 in the instant case. No individual
employee is entitled as of right to be present during bargaining or at the
conclusion of such an agreement. To require that notice and the right
to be present be given to each employee on any occasion when a provision
in a collective agreement having general application to all employees was
being interpreted would be to destroy the principle of the bargaining
agent and to violate the purpose of the act. 17
Judson also pointed out that Hoogendoorn's rights were not in
fact in issue at the arbitration. He seemed to adopt the distinction
drawn by Laskin J.A. in the Bradley case to distinguish that case
from the latter's decision in Hoogendoorn.8
Hall J. for himself and Spence J. neither accepted nor rejected
the concept of the "policy grievance." At any rate, Hall J. certainly
did not classify the proceedings in this case as an arbitration of a
policy grievance, but he did find that "the proceeding was aimed
entirely at securing Hoogendoorn's dismissal."19 Hall J. was content
to repeat Wells J.A.'s disposal of the "policy grievance" argument: 20
15 Id., at 313-314.
16 [1967] 1 O.R., at 730.
17 65 D.L.R. 2d, at 644.
18 Id., at 646.
19 Id., at 648.
20 Id.
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In my opinion, there might be some weight to this point of view if the
proceedings before the learned arbitrator had proceeded as an impersonalinterpretation of the agreement without reference to any individual. One
has only to look at the learned arbitrator's reasons, however, to realize
that this was not the case. He dealt exclusively with Hoogendoorn's caseand any reference to general principles a  unrelated to Hoogendoorn, in
my opinion, was coincidental. 2 t
Later in his judgment, considering he paragraph from Laskin's
judgment in the Bradley case which I have reproduced above,22 Hall J.
found the two cases indistinguishable. Having failed to find a dis-tinction between the oas eed the Bradley result
was the better of the two, again for reasons which he found in Wells
J.A.'s judgment, which in turn was based on the reasoning of the
Privy Council in University of eyln v. Pernando.3 Thus Hall .
ignores Laskin J.A. 's warning against using United Kingdom case
law on natural justice because of the absence in the United Kingdom
cases of the collective bargaining legislation which has to be con-
sidered in these Ontario cases.24
The fifth member of the Court, Cartwright J. agreed with theLaskin-Judson approach on the scheme of the Labour Relations Act
but agreed with the reasons and conclusions of Hall . purely because
he found as a fact that the arbitration was an inquiry into the single
question whether or not the employer was bound to discharge the
applicant. Cartwright thus impliedly finds that the grievance was
neither one of interpretation only, nor one of general application,the types of "policy grievance" in which Judson J. would bar inter-
vention by an individual.
The problems that arise with regard to individual rights under
collective bargaining agreements arise due to the paradox inherent
in collective bargaining itself. The rationale of collective bargaining
is that the workers bargaining individually have no rights, and being
employed at will, are subject to management's mercy except for the
rare cases where an individual employment contract exists. To pro-
tect these individuals' rights, the legislature has deemed it wise to
encourage a system whereby those rights are entrusted to collective
institutions, unions, if the majority in a 'bargaining unit' so desire.
That legislation has even gone so far, for example, as to allow the
collective organizations to bar from employment those who are not
members.27Individual rights in many ways and in all stages of the collective
bargaining procedure may be submerged in what is hoped to be a
"better" arrangement for the body of workers as a whole. When a
21 [1967] 1h.R. at 716.
22 Sup[ra, note 14.
23 (1960) 1 All E.R. 631.
24 See [1967 l 1 O.R., at 731.
25 65 D.L.R. 2d, at 642.
26 Le Syndicat Catholique des Employees de Magasins de Quebec Inc. v.
La Compagnie Paquet Ltee [1959] S.C.R. 206.
27 Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 35(4).
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contract is made, the law says that all workers will be bound by it,2
8
whether they agree with its terms or not. There is no appeal, unless
a sufficient number of workers move to have the union decertified,
if this procedure can be called an 'appeal'.
The union, however, is bound by a duty to treat all employees
fairly when it bargains. The so-called "duty of fair representation"
has often been declared by the Supreme Court of the United States29
and has been mentioned by our Supreme Court.
30
In the Wallace Barnes3' decision, the Ontario Labour Relations
Board summarized its view of the scheme of the Labour Relations
Act:
... when it is considered that the trade union is the exclusive bargaining
agent of all employees in the bargaining unit (whether members or not),
that the collective agreement is binding upon the employees in the bar-
gaining unit (whether members or not), that the collective agreement
must provide for the final and binding settlement of all differences be-
tween the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administra-
tion or alleged violation of the agreement and finally, that such settlement
(by arbitration) is binding on the employees affected, it is clear that the
legislature intended that in order to gain the advantages of collective
bargaining, employees must be prepared to surrender rights which they
might otherwise have.
Thus, in order to secure the benefits of collective bargaining, the
employees act through a collective bargaining agent, that is, a trade
union. The trade union is the bargaining agent for the employees for
the purpose of negotiating a collective agreement covering their working
terms and conditions. The trade union is also their bargaining agent with
respect to the administration of the collective agreement and when dis-
putes arise involving the interpretation or alleged violation of the agree-
ment, these are matters for the parties to that agreement, that is, the
trade union and the employer. The ultimate decision, whether it be by
negotiation or through arbitration, is binding not only on the parties but
on the employees as well .... 32
There has never been an assault on the union's exclusive conduct
of negotiation of a collective agreement, yet in Hoogendoorn and
Bradley the courts have allowed an assault on the union's administra-
tion of the agreement. Is not the administration of the agreement just
as exclusive a bargaining right as the negotiation of it?
It had been thought to be clear in Canada that resort to arbitra-
tion should be only at the instigation of the parties to the collective
agreement. This policy is evident from as far back as the Corporation
of the City of Toronto case,3 3 where it was pointed out that harmony
in industrial relations would not be achieved by allowing every griev-
ance real or fancied to be pursued to its ultimate conclusion.
28 Id., s. 37.
29 e.g., Humphrey v. Moore 375 U.S. 335, Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41,
Syres v. Oil Workers 350 U.S. 892, Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen 323 U.S. 210, Steele v. L. & N.R.R. 323 U.S. 192.
30 O.C.A.W. Local 16-601 v. Imperial Oil [19631 S.C.R. 584, 593 per
Martland J.
31 Vera Elkington and the Wallace Barnes Co. Ltd. 61 C.L.L.C. 928.
32 Id., at 930-931.
33 The Corporation of the City of Toronto Case (1947) D.L.S. 7-1289,
adopted by the O.L.R.B. in Wallace Barnes 61 C.L.L.C. at 931; see also
Nabess and Lynn Lake Base Metal Workers Federal Union v. Sherrit Gordon
Mines and Laskin's discussion of this case in 6 CAx. B.J. 278.
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The same conclusion has been reached by Professor Archibald
Cox in his classic treatment of the individual rights question34 and by
the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Vaca v. Sipes.35
This was a case where the union refused to take a discharge grievance
to arbitration. The United States Supreme Court declared:
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore
a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion, we do not
agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.3 6
In its reasons the Vaca court lists several beneficial results of this
view: frivolous grievances are filtered out before the more expensive
arbitration procedure, consistent results will be obtained, greater
emphasis will be placed on major collective bargaining problems.
And finally, the settlement process furthers the interests of the union as
statutory agent and as co-author of the bargaining agreement in repre-
senting the employees in the enforcement of that agreement . .. .37
Several detrimental results were also enumerated if individuals
were to be allowed to force arbitration of his grievance:
If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance
regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract
would be substantially undermined, thus destroying the employers' confi-
dence in the unions' authority and returning the individual grievance to
the vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotiation. Moreover, under
such a rule, a significantly greater number of grievances would proceed
to arbitration. This would greatly increase the cost of the grievance
machinery and could so overburden the arbitration process as to prevent
it from functioning successfully.38
To protect individual rights, Professor Cox, and the Supreme
Court of the United States put reliance on the doctrine of the duty
of fair representation. If this duty were breached, the individual
would have a right of action against the union, and the company (if
the latter were acting collusively).
In light of Laskin J.A.'s views in this regard,39 and the fact that
Judson, Ritchie and Cartwright J.J. agreed with his interpretation of
the scheme of the Labour Relations Act, it would appear that the
individual will not be allowed to process his own grievance to the
point of arbitration. Why then should his position be different if he
is faced with hostile union action rather than the union's mere refusal
to act? If the union is to have exclusive right to process grievances,
why should that exclusive right yield to the presence of the individual
grievor just because an arbitration is already underway? Logically,
there should be no difference. If arbitration is an extension of collec-
tive bargaining, then no matter what the issues are, should not the
exclusive rights of the bargaining agent remain exclusive? Further-
34 Bights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAv. L. Rnv. 601.
35 386 U.S. 171. This case in effect adopts the Cox view in the individual
rights debate, even referring to his article above.
36 Id., at 192.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 [1967] 1 O.R. at 722, 724, 726 and also 6 CAN. B.J. 278.
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more, the wider purpose of the grievance procedure does not suddenly
change when arbitration begins. This wider purpose was expressed in
the United States case, Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers:
In the handling of grievances, as in the negotiation of the terms of an
agreement, the interests of all employees are involved. The principal
purpose of the grievance procedure is not to provide a framework within
which individual desires and complaints can be taken up with the em-
ployer; rather, it is to provide a framework within which the employees
may bargain collectively to determine how the general principles of the
agreement are to be applied to day-to-dLy problems.40
It could be argued that there is a difference between the action
and inaction situations. The difference may be that grievance proce-
dure is a continuation of collective bargaining but only up to the
point of arbitration, at which point it becomes "adjudication". The
same objections to individuals participating in the grievance proce-
dure or other steps in the collective bargaining process might not
apply to intervention in the "adjudication".
Prof. Laskin, before his appointment to the bench, writing in sup-
port of individual rights under collective agreements, had observed:
If the union takes the issue to arbitration under the prescribed procedure,
is there any reason why the dissident employees should be denied the
opportnity to intervene? When one considers that the general run of
labour relations legislation makes an arbitration award binding on em-
ployees as well as on Union and employer, it would be inordinate obsti-
nacy to push the formal position that the arbitration clauses concern the
Union and employer alone. Collective agreements as well as labour rela-
tions legislation have little to say about procedure in labour-managementarbitration. Conduct of the cases is left to the arbitration tribunal and it
would be a shocking dereliction of adjudicative duty to deny an applica-
tion by an interested party to intervene.41
Laskin J.A. again used the term "adjudication" in the Bradley
decision.42 However, the fact that he described arbitration of policy
grievances as an 'extension of the administration of the bargain' in
Hoogendoorn43 would indicate that he has not attached a narrow or
technical connotation to the term in the context of arbitration.
The action-inaction distinction does make sense in one way, in
that arbitration is no longer collective bargaining. The power of
decision is out of the hands of the parties; they are no longer negotiat-
ing. But what if in the midst of an arbitration the parties do suddenly
agree, is the arbitrator to prevent this? Perhaps now all interests
before the arbitrator would have to agree before the arbitrator would
allow a settlement.
If such a distinction were to be made in order to defend individual
intervention in arbitration, the distinction could be used to help pre-
vent the exclusive bargaining rights of the union being undermined in
the initiation of grievances and in the negotiation of the collective
agreement itself.
40 171 F. Supp. 782, 793.
41 6 CAN. B.J. 278, 288.
42 [1967] 2 O.R. at 317, see supra.
43 [1967] 1 O.R. at 725, see supra.
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If individuals were denied the right to intervene, they would
be forced to rely on the doctrine of the duty of fair representation to
protect themselves. One weakness of this concept is that, besides the
much greater expense and delay of a court action, courts have a
strong hesitancy to order reinstatement.44 Reinstatement is the rem-
edy most valuable to the grievor and it is a remedy that arbitration
tribunals have no fear in using. Another weakness of the protection
given by the fair representation doctrine is that breach of the duty is
very difficult to establish.45
Clyde W. Summers, a strong advocate of an individual rights
approach to the problem of rights under collective agreements46 be-
lieves most of the practical objections to allowing the individual to
process his own grievances to the arbitration stage are absent when
the individual seeks merely to intervene in arbitration already under-
way. Summers notes that,
. . . the collective agreement parties' freedom to agree is not circum-
scribed, for the arbitration manifests their inability to agree. They are
not drawn unwillingly into the procedure nor saddled with a wholly un-
invited burden. At most, the costs may be increased a fraction by the
addition of the intervenor. Selection of the arbitrator poses little problem
for the intervening individual will normally be bound by the collective
parties' choice.47
Thus, why not allow intervention especially in light of the fact
that the duty of fair representation remedy is so inadequate?
But there remain many objections to intervention. Professor
H. W. Arthurs has pointed out the most important objection in these
words:
The unions' ability to function as a broker between divergent employee
interests, and its authority to speak on behalf of the group, are both
undermined.48
Professor Arthurs notes also that even as a protection of indi-
vidual rights, intervention is only operative in cases which go to
arbitration; the individual right is not protected if the grievance in
which he opposes the union is settled prior to arbitration. We would
have the anomolous position that an individual would have the right
to be heard only in the fortuitous circumstances that the employer
and union could not agree.
44 See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U.L.R. 362, 410n.
45 In Vaca v. Sipes 386 U.S. 171 the U.S. Supreme Court canvasses the
law on this subject.
46 Summers would allow individuals to press grievances themselves even
to arbitration (at their own expense and with the right of the Union to also
participate). See, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements-A Preliminary
Analysis, in STrnN (ed.) Nnw YORK UNxRSsrmY 12T ANuAL CoNERxC E
o LABOUR 63 and Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L.R. 362. Laskin advocates a somewhat similar approach in 6 CAN.
B.J. 278.
47 37 N.Y.U.L.R. at 405.
48 Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's Becond
Century, 45 CAN. B. REv. 786 at 805.
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It would seem that the natural justice cases try to ensure that
the official or tribunal with decision-making power has an opportunity
of hearing both sides of the issue to be decided. Thus in the labour
grievance case natural justice would require that the decision-making
power be exercised only after hearing all sides of an issue. Who holds
decision-making power in the labour relations grievance? Until arbi-
tration, it is jointly held by the parties to the agreement and is exer-
cised by the use of negotiation, compromise, and all the tools con-
nected with negotiation. Ultimately consensus is reached and a
decision is made. Only when this process fails and a decision is still
not made due to the parties' failure to agree, is resort made to arbitra-
tion. If the arbitrator is now to be required to hear all sides, as a
result of the Hoogendoorn decision, why should the same principle
not apply to the usual holders of the decision-making power, the
parties? The answer is, according to the Vaca v. Sipes reasoning,
that collective bargaining as established by the Labour Relations Act,
would be frustrated, thus negativing the presumption of a require-
ment of fairness to the individual, (although there is some protection
for victimized individuals through the breach of duty of fair repre-
sentation action).
A more appropriate question would be: if the natural justice
doctrine is not applicable to the handling of labour grievances at the
pre-arbitration stage, what is the logic in applying it when the
decision-making power is assigned by the parties to a single decision-
maker? The lack of logic is especially apparent when the parties may
continue to hold decision-making power in that they may still reach a
decision by settlement even after arbitration begins.
If the natural justice principle is to be applied to labour arbitra-
tion, it is usually thought necessary to limit it in some way. No one
has ever thought that individuals should be allowed to intervene
unless their status or some property right is in danger of being
affected. Anti-union sentiment for example would not be sufficient
to entitle an individual to intervene.
Summers would limit the right to intervene by a 'direct-result
test'.
The right to intervene need be extended only to those directly affected
by the outcome of the case. Those who are indirectly affected by the
decision as a precedent have no greater claim to being a party to an
arbitration than to any other legal proceeding. Repercussions may reach
remote employees, but that does not make their interest sufficient to
require intervention. Indeed, it is the primary concern of the union to
urge these more widespread and remote consequences before the arbi-
trator. The need is only that those immediately and tangibly affected by
the specific case be allowed full opportunity to be heard. Though the
line may be hard to define, it is less difficult to draw in practice.49
This seems to have been implicitly adopted by all the judges in
the case. Where there is a difference of view among the judges de-
ciding the Hoogendoorn case, it is about a further requirement before
intervention would be allowed, namely whether the proceedings spe-
49 37 N.Y.U.L.R. at 407.
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cifically affect the individual. Laskin J.A. would go so far as to allow
the arbitrator to use the specific facts of a case as background to inter-
pretation and deny intervention as long as the arbitrator did not make
particular determinations. 50 Judson J. seems to accept this view,
Hall J. and apparently Cartwright J. do not.
If the direct result test were used, any submission to arbitration
could be drafted so skillfully that individuals would be refused the
right to intervene because their interests would not be 'particularly
determined'. Hall J. would allow the individual the right to intervene,
no matter in what form the issue was drawn, if in fact the proceeding
is 'aimed entirely' at him.5' This seems also to be the conclusion of
Cartwright J. where he states:
The reason that I differ from the result at which he Judson J. arrives is
that I am unable to regard the arbitration which was held as anything
other than an inquiry as to a single question, that is whether or not the
employer was bound to discharge the appellant.52
All the judges, including Wells J.A. and Hall J. admit the con-
cept of the 'policy grievance', but as a result of this case there cannot
be many instances where an individual would be barred from inter-
vening because the issue before the arbitrator is a 'policy grievance'.
The notion is, to all intents and purposes, a dead letter.
It will be interesting to see what effect this result will have on
the conduct of labour arbitrations. There is bound to be some con-
fusion at first, but probably the snags can be sorted out without too
much difficulty. Hopefully, this inroad on the unions' exclusive bar-
gaining rights can be restricted to the arbitration proceeding and not
to bargaining itself either at the negotiation of the agreement or at
grievance handling preliminary to arbitration. If problems arise which
threaten to inundate the usefulness of arbitration, the legislature
may have to be called to the rescue.
RODERICK G. FERGUSON.
Vana v. Tosta et al.
DAMAGES-DEATH OF A WIFE-MOTHER-FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT.
The question of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act' in the
case of the death of a wife and mother is the source of great interest
and confusion because the basis of the award and the items which may
50 See Bradley [1967] 2 O.R. 314, 315. Hoogendoorn [1967] 1 O.R. 712, 730.
51 65 D.L.R. 2d, at 648.
52 Id., at 642.
I R.S.O. 1950 c. 132.
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